Background: Former high school students that were staff members of the school's newspaper, filed suit in Federal District Court against petitioners, the school district and school officials, alleging that respondents' First Amendment rights were violated by the deletion from a certain issue of the paper of two pages that included an article describing school students' experiences with pregnancy and another article discussing the impact of divorce on students at the school. The newspaper was written and edited by a journalism class, as part of the school's curriculum. Pursuant to the school's practice, the teacher in charge of the paper submitted page proofs to the school's principal, who objected to the pregnancy story because the pregnant students, although not named, might be identified from the text, and because he believed that the article's references to sexual activity and birth control were inappropriate for some of the younger students. The principal objected to the divorce article because the page proofs he was furnished identified by name (deleted by the teacher from the final version) a student who complained of her father's conduct, and the principal believed that the student's parents should have been given an opportunity to respond to the remarks or to consent to their publication. Believing that there was no time to make necessary changes in the articles if the paper was to be issued before the end of the school year, the principal directed that the pages on which they appeared be withheld from publication even though other, unobjectionable articles were included on such pages. The District Court held that no First Amendment violation had occurred. The Court of Appeals reversed.
Held:Respondents' First Amendment rights were not violated.
(a) First Amendment rights of students in the public schools are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other settings, and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. A school need not tolerate student speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission, even though the government could not censor similar speech outside the school.
Conclusion:The school newspaper here cannot be characterized as a forum for public expression. School facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have, by policy or by practice, opened the facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations. If the facilities have instead been reserved for other intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, then no public forum has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the school community. The school officials in this case did not deviate from their policy that the newspaper's production was to be part of the educational curriculum and a regular classroom activity under the journalism teacher's control as to almost every aspect of publication. The officials did not evince any intent to open the paper's pages to indiscriminate use by its student reporters and editors, or by the student body generally. Accordingly, school officials were entitled to regulate the paper's contents in any reasonable manner.
-The standard for determining when a school may punish student expression that happens to occur on school premises is not the standard for determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and resources to the dissemination of student expression. Educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities, so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.
... The school principal acted reasonably in this case in requiring the deletion of the pregnancy article, the divorce article, and the other articles that were to appear on the same pages of the newspaper.
Monday, October 29, 2007
Cox v. Louisiana
Monday, January 18, 1965
Issues:
First Amendment, Protest Demonstrations
The Case:
On the morning of December 15, 1961, Elton Cox Appellant was the leader of a civil rights demonstration in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, of 2,000 Negro students protesting segregation and the arrest and imprisonment the previous day of other Negro students who had participated in a protest against racial segregation. The group assembled a few blocks from the courthouse, where appellant identified himself to officers as the group's leader and explained the purpose of the demonstration. Following his refusal to disband the group, appellant led it in an orderly march toward the courthouse. In the vicinity of the courthouse, officers stopped appellant who, after explaining the purpose and program of the demonstration, was told by the Police Chief that he could hold the meeting so long as he confined it to the west side of the street. Appellant directed the group to the west sidewalk, across the street from the courthouse and 101 feet from its steps. There, the group, standing five feet deep and occupying almost the entire block but not obstructing the street, displayed signs and sang songs which evoked response from the students in the courthouse jail. Appellant addressed the group. The Sheriff, construing as inflammatory appellant's concluding exhortation to the students to "sit in" at uptown lunch counters, ordered dispersal of the group which, not being directly forthcoming, was effected by tear gas. Appellant was arrested the next day and was convicted of peace disturbance, obstructing public passages, and courthouse picketing.
Question
Does a statutory "disturbance of the peace" conviction, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court began by noting The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, two of which (peace disturbance and obstructing public passages) are involved in this case; the third (courthouse picketing) being involved in No. 49, post at 559.
Held: 1. In arresting and convicting appellant under the circumstances disclosed by this record, Louisiana deprived him of his rights of free speech and free assembly in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
2. The breach of the peace statute is unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope, for Louisiana has defined "breach of the peace" as "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet"; yet one of the very functions of free speech is to invite dispute.
3. The practice in Baton Rouge of allowing local officials unfettered discretion in regulating the use of streets for peaceful parades and meetings notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in the statute against obstructing public passages abridged appellant's freedom of speech and assembly in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Issues:
First Amendment, Protest Demonstrations
The Case:
On the morning of December 15, 1961, Elton Cox Appellant was the leader of a civil rights demonstration in Baton Rouge, Louisiana, of 2,000 Negro students protesting segregation and the arrest and imprisonment the previous day of other Negro students who had participated in a protest against racial segregation. The group assembled a few blocks from the courthouse, where appellant identified himself to officers as the group's leader and explained the purpose of the demonstration. Following his refusal to disband the group, appellant led it in an orderly march toward the courthouse. In the vicinity of the courthouse, officers stopped appellant who, after explaining the purpose and program of the demonstration, was told by the Police Chief that he could hold the meeting so long as he confined it to the west side of the street. Appellant directed the group to the west sidewalk, across the street from the courthouse and 101 feet from its steps. There, the group, standing five feet deep and occupying almost the entire block but not obstructing the street, displayed signs and sang songs which evoked response from the students in the courthouse jail. Appellant addressed the group. The Sheriff, construing as inflammatory appellant's concluding exhortation to the students to "sit in" at uptown lunch counters, ordered dispersal of the group which, not being directly forthcoming, was effected by tear gas. Appellant was arrested the next day and was convicted of peace disturbance, obstructing public passages, and courthouse picketing.
Question
Does a statutory "disturbance of the peace" conviction, for a peaceable demonstration that contains speech that may potentially incite violence, infringe on a demonstrator's First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and assembly?
Conclusion
Yes. In a 7-to-2 decision, the Court began by noting The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, two of which (peace disturbance and obstructing public passages) are involved in this case; the third (courthouse picketing) being involved in No. 49, post at 559.
Held: 1. In arresting and convicting appellant under the circumstances disclosed by this record, Louisiana deprived him of his rights of free speech and free assembly in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
2. The breach of the peace statute is unconstitutionally vague in its overly broad scope, for Louisiana has defined "breach of the peace" as "to agitate, to arouse from a state of repose, to molest, to interrupt, to hinder, to disquiet"; yet one of the very functions of free speech is to invite dispute.
3. The practice in Baton Rouge of allowing local officials unfettered discretion in regulating the use of streets for peaceful parades and meetings notwithstanding the prohibitions contained in the statute against obstructing public passages abridged appellant's freedom of speech and assembly in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.
Tinker v. Des Moines: The Precedents
-Waugh v. Mississippi University (1915): the Court ruled that the states control institutions they established and that the state can prohibit things it believes distracts from the purpose which the state desired to exist.
-Meyer v. Nebraska (1923): the Court ruled that laws which interfered with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent were unconstitutional.
-Cox v. Louisiana (1965): the Supreme Court ruled that the rights of free speech and assembly do not mean that anyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time.
-Hammond v. South Carolina State College (1967): it was ruled that people in public schools are protected by constitutional rights.
-Meyer v. Nebraska (1923): the Court ruled that laws which interfered with the liberty of teacher, student, and parent were unconstitutional.
-Cox v. Louisiana (1965): the Supreme Court ruled that the rights of free speech and assembly do not mean that anyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at any public place and at any time.
-Hammond v. South Carolina State College (1967): it was ruled that people in public schools are protected by constitutional rights.
Tinker v. Des Moines, 393, U.S., 503 (1969)
John and Mary Beth Tinker, aged 13 and 16 respectively, attended public school in Des Moines, Iowa. In December, 1965, they and their parents attended a meeting to discuss ways of protesting the Vietnam War. The group decided to publicly wear black armbands as a symbol of their protest.
When the school principals heard about the decision at the meeting, they passed a rule that prohibited the wearing of an armband in school; those who would refuse to remove an armband would be suspended from school until it was removed. The principals stated that they hoped that this rule would prevent any disorder.
The Tinkers, aware of the new rule, wore their armbands to school. During the day no classes were disorderly and school went on as usual. Before the end of the day, however, the Tinkers went home because the school principal suspended them until they would remove the armbands. Their parents disagreed with the school's rule and actions, and took the case to court. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the regulation was within the Board's power, despite the absence of any finding of substantial interference with the conduct of school activities. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed by an equally divided court. Held:
1. In wearing armbands, the petitioners were quiet and passive. They were not disruptive and did not impinge upon the rights of others. In these circumstances, their conduct was within the protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. Pp. 505-506.
2. First Amendment rights are available to teachers and students, subject to application in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Pp. 506-507.
3. A prohibition against expression of opinion, without any evidence that the rule is necessary to avoid substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of others, is not permissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 507-514.
The Verdict:
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tinker in this case. In Tinker v. Des Moines, 393, U.S., 503 (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7-2 against the school and in favor of the students wearing the armbands, provided their actions or speech do not interfere with school work or the rights of others in the classroom.
When the school principals heard about the decision at the meeting, they passed a rule that prohibited the wearing of an armband in school; those who would refuse to remove an armband would be suspended from school until it was removed. The principals stated that they hoped that this rule would prevent any disorder.
The Tinkers, aware of the new rule, wore their armbands to school. During the day no classes were disorderly and school went on as usual. Before the end of the day, however, the Tinkers went home because the school principal suspended them until they would remove the armbands. Their parents disagreed with the school's rule and actions, and took the case to court. The District Court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the regulation was within the Board's power, despite the absence of any finding of substantial interference with the conduct of school activities. The Court of Appeals, sitting en banc, affirmed by an equally divided court. Held:
1. In wearing armbands, the petitioners were quiet and passive. They were not disruptive and did not impinge upon the rights of others. In these circumstances, their conduct was within the protection of the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth. Pp. 505-506.
2. First Amendment rights are available to teachers and students, subject to application in light of the special characteristics of the school environment. Pp. 506-507.
3. A prohibition against expression of opinion, without any evidence that the rule is necessary to avoid substantial interference with school discipline or the rights of others, is not permissible under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pp. 507-514.
The Verdict:
The U.S. Supreme Court ruled in favor of Tinker in this case. In Tinker v. Des Moines, 393, U.S., 503 (1969), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 7-2 against the school and in favor of the students wearing the armbands, provided their actions or speech do not interfere with school work or the rights of others in the classroom.
To what extent are adults and minors protected under the first amendment?
Although in the constitution it is meant to apply to everyone this is not the case in public schools. It is sometimes over looked for teenagers/students because they are less educated about their basic rights, and thus can be easily manipulated. For instance we have the freedom of speech but it is limited on campus. It is like abiding by another law when in school. Students' first amendment rights are limited because whatever actions they take effects the administration that is responsible for the teenagers.
(Tinker v. Des Moines is a famous 1969 case involving two students protesting the war in Vietnam by wearing black armbands to school. The principal, ostensibly apprehensive about the disruption such armbands may provoke, asked the students to remove the armbands. When they refused, they were suspended. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the armbands in this instance were sufficiently close to speech to be protected by the First Amendment, and that the principal failed to show that wearing them would substantially disrupt the school atmosphere. Justice Black and Justice Harlan dissented.)
(Tinker v. Des Moines is a famous 1969 case involving two students protesting the war in Vietnam by wearing black armbands to school. The principal, ostensibly apprehensive about the disruption such armbands may provoke, asked the students to remove the armbands. When they refused, they were suspended. In deciding the case, the Supreme Court ruled 7-2 that the armbands in this instance were sufficiently close to speech to be protected by the First Amendment, and that the principal failed to show that wearing them would substantially disrupt the school atmosphere. Justice Black and Justice Harlan dissented.)
Thursday, October 4, 2007
First Amendment of the Constitution
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress or grievances.
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